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Abstract—This paper presents a methodology to emulate Single
Event Upsets (SEUs) in FPGA flip-flops (FFs). Since the content
of a FF is not modifiable through the FPGA configuration
memory bits, a dedicated design is required for fault injection in
the FFs. The method proposed in this paper is a hybrid approach
that combines FPGA partial reconfiguration and extra logic
added to the circuit under test, without modifying its operation.
This approach has been integrated into a fault-injection platform,
named NESSY (Non intrusive ErrorS injection SYstem), developed
by our research group. Finally, this paper includes results on a
Virtex-5 FPGA demonstrating the validity of the method on the
ITC’99 benchmark set and a Feed-Forward Equalization (FFE)
filter. In comparison with other approaches in the literature,
this methodology reduces the resource consumption introduced
to carry out the fault injection in FFs, at the cost of adding very
little time overhead (1.6 µs per fault).
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
IN the last few years, radiation effects on embeddedsystems, such as Aplication Specific Integrated Circuits
(ASICs) and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are
becoming a major concern for the semiconductor industry
due to the growing use of these kinds of devices in radiation
hazardous environments and the increase in device count per
chip [1], [2]. Radiations may cause soft errors known as
Single Event Effects (SEEs), which alter the operation of the
microelectronic components of embedded systems.
Several hardening techniques and manufacturing methodo-
logies offer different trade-offs between SEE tolerance and fle-
xibility/adaptability in the final implementation of the circuit.
Typically, the most widespread alternative has been to ma-
nufacture digital circuits as ASICs. Important reasons justify
this choice, such as power, area and performance. In addition,
their typical operation frequency for highly reliable systems
(in the order of just a few hundreds of MHz), makes these
systems essentially vulnerable to Single Event Upsets (SEUs)
on their sequential elements (flip-flops (FFs) and memory
cells), while keeping the vulnerability of their combinatorial
elements very low with respect to other technologies. Indeed,
recent studies [3] indicate that, for technologies under 100
nm, the vulnerability of combinatorial logic exceeds that of
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the sequential one only for high-frequency systems (typically,
on the order of several GHz [4], [5]).
An interesting alternative to ASIC implementations is the
utilization of reconfigurable devices, and especially FPGAs.
The reason is that they present run-time reconfiguration, which
makes it possible to change the functionality of the circuit
“on the fly”. This feature is potentially interesting to save
weight and space since it allows to multiplex several designs
in one FPGA. However, these kinds of devices are usually
more vulnerable to SEUs, because of the enormous size of
their configuration memory. These are Static Random Access
Memories (SRAM) that describe the functionality at the struc-
tural level of the circuit(s) implemented on the FPGA. For
instance, a medium-sized FPGA, such as a XilinxTMVirtex-5
XC5VLX110T, contains 29,124,608 configuration bits, which
represent 84% of the bits vulnerable to SEUs in a circuit
implemented in this device (including both FFs (69,120 bits)
and BRAMs (5,328,000 bits)) [6].
A common technique to study SEU effects on digital circuits
consists in testing them under radiation [7]–[10]. However,
because of the high cost and tidiness of these experiments [11],
alternative approaches, such as fault simulation and emulation
techniques have become such a popular alternative.
Simulation-based fault injection approaches [12] need a
huge computational effort since they just simulate the execu-
tion of the circuit at the desired level (behavioral, structural...).
Hence their capability for analyzing a significant number of
faults on circuits with millions of gates is limited. Hence,
emulation-based fault injection has emerged to accelerate the
experiments. These techniques may target either ASICs and
FPGA-based systems, but they have in common the fact that
they use FPGAs to emulate the circuit under test.
Emulation-based fault injection methodologies can
be classified into instrumentation-based [13]–[16] and
reconfiguration-based [17]–[25]. The next two subsections
elaborate on these two types of methodologies in greater
details.
A. Instrumentation-based Fault Injection
These techniques involve adding fault injector circuits called
saboteurs to each fault site [13]–[16]. They do not involve
any time penalty additional to the execution of the testbench
on the target circuit, once the modifications needed on the
circuit have been made. However, their main limitation is that
they introduce some area overhead, which may limit their
applicability on large circuits.
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performing certain modifications in the initial netlist, or by
using the commercial tools. For instance, the method presented
in [13] needs 150 µs on average per bitflip, since it uses the se-
rial Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface to communicate
between the host computer and the FPGA.
Other two interesting instrumentation-based approaches are
described in [14], [15] and [16]. Authors in [14] present the
Hardware Description Language (HDL)-based fault injection
tool NETlist Fault Injection (NETFI). This tool injects faults
at the register-transfer level of a processor by adding extra
hardware to the sensitive registers of a target processor. This
approach is based on the modification of the built-in libraries
of XilinxTM [15]. It adds some extra hardware per FF, as well
as a complex controller that steers the fault-injection process
on the whole circuit. This controller requires as much memory
as needed to store n m-bit words, n being the number of FFs in
the design, and m being the number of entries in the testbench.
In addition, extra hardware to implement the controller itself
is also needed. Hence, even though no precise information is
provided in [14] about the area overhead that this approach
introduces, everything suggests that it is considerable.
On the other hand, in [16], three different techniques are
presented, so-called time-multiplexed, state-scan and mask-
scan, which offer different trade-offs between area overhead
and performance. At best, they can achieve fault injection
times on the order of just a few µs. However, these three
techniques also involve an important area overhead. In this
case, since all of them are very well documented in [16], it has
been possible to compare them with the approach presented
in this paper. More details about this point will be provided
in Section IV.
B. Reconfiguration-based Fault Injection
Reconfiguration-based approaches consist of modifying the
appropriate information in the configuration memory of the
FPGA in order to inject a fault [17]–[25]. In these techniques,
the reconfiguration process is the speed bottleneck, instead of
the extra logic added by instrumentation-based ones. These
techniques may be based either on total or partial reconfigu-
ration.
Approaches based on total reconfiguration use the Global
Set/Reset (GSR) line of the device for this purpose. This line
sets/resets all the FFs on the device depending on the polarity
of this line. This polarity is determined for each FF in the con-
figuration memory through a configuration memory bit named
INIT0/INIT1 [26]. Hence, they involve reading the state of all
the FFs in the FPGA [19] (by means of a Capture&Readback
operation [26]), modifying the INIT0/INIT1 bit of some of
them according to the retrieved information, pulsing the GSR
line, and restoring the configuration memory of its initial
status. This process is very slow since it necessarily involves
iterating on all the INIT0/INIT1 bits of all the FFs in the
circuit. Indeed, [19] reports 916 seconds to inject 3000 bitflips
in one FF and [17] reports 3.5 seconds needed for a FF fault
injection in a XilinxTMVirtex-II FPGA.
Another interesting reconfiguration-based system is Fault
Tolerant - University of Seville Hardware DEbugging System
(FT-UNSHADES), which implements a read-modify-write ap-
proach [20], [21]. The reported time to inject and evaluate a
fault is on the order of 100 ms (in this case, no information
was found only for a single FF fault injection) and it uses
the JTAG debugging port to this end. An enhanced version
of this tool, named FT-UNSHADES2 [22], [23], speeds up
the communications by using PCIExpress, rather than USB
transactions. This allows reaching fault injection rates of up to
10,000 faults per second. In addition, it features fault injection
on the reconfiguration memory of the FPGA, via the Select
Map port. However, for what concerns fault injections on FFs,
they continue using the approach based on the manipulation of
the GSR line and total configuration (as previously described).
However, approaches based on partial reconfiguration can
greatly speed up this process. Typically, they use the FPGA
Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP), which speeds
up the fault injection process up to 12 times with respect
to equivalent total reconfiguration ones [24]. This idea has
been used for other fault injection tools targeting the whole
configuration memory of the FPGA. For instance, the authors
in [25] report only 4.6 ms per fault injection and evaluation.
However, even though partial reconfiguration through the
ICAP port is potentially very interesting for carrying out fault
injection on FPGA FFs, only a few works have explored this
possibility. Among them, one can highlight [18]. Nevertheless,
it is based on manipulating the GSR line of the FPGA, which
affects all the FFs of the FPGA simultaneously. For that
reason, previous (and time consuming) readback and total
reconfiguration operations are needed in order to control how
this signal is switched to each one of the FFs so SEUs are
emulated in a controlled way. For the sake of performance,
the methodology presented in this paper follows a different
approach: using the local SR and REV signals to the FPGA
slices. This is one of the key contributions of the approach
presented in this paper. The following subsection will elaborate
this point in greater detail.
C. The Presented Hybrid Fault Injection Approach for FFs
The main contribution of this paper is a technique for
fault emulation in FFs using FPGAs, and exploiting partial
reconfiguration. It is a hybrid technique that takes the best
of both instrumentation-based and reconfiguration-based SEU-
emulation approaches. Hence, it offers a good trade-off be-
tween area overhead and performance, making it adequate for
comprehensive fault-injection campaigns on all types of circuit
(small or large). On the one hand, it features a considerably
lower area overhead with respect to other instrumentation-
based systems [13]–[16]. On the other hand, it speeds up the
fault injection process by up to 12 times thanks to partial
reconfiguration, as opposed to to other reconfiguration-based
ones [17]–[24]. Basically, our approach injects bitflips in the
FPGA FFs by manipulating the local resets of the FPGA
slices. This is a key difference with respect to the approaches
based on capture&readback and total reconfiguration [22],
[23], where the global GSR line is used.
It is also extremely important to point out that the metho-
dology presented in this paper does not target injecting bitflips
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technology. Hence the methodology of this paper uses partial
reconfiguration to carry out fault injections in the content of
FFs, and FPGAs are used just to emulate the SEUs. Thus, even
though it introduces changes in the original circuit, neither
these changes alter its functionality, nor it introduces new
sensitive zones in the circuit, or modifies the existing ones.
In fact, typically, instrumentation-based techniques share this
approach (such as [16], for instance).
This methodology has been integrated into NESSY (Non
intrusive ErrorS injection SYstem) [27], a fault-injection tool
developed by our research group that targeted the SRAM-
based configuration memory of XilinxTMFPGAs. Thus, the
approach presented in this paper makes NESSY capable of
performing either of the two following types of SEU emulation
campaigns: in the configuration memory of the FPGA (only
for circuits to be implemented in this target technology), and
in the circuit FFs. This means that NESSY has been extended
to support two modes of operation. For the first case, NESSY
will use the approach described in [27], which targets circuits
implemented in FPGA technology. However, for fault injection
in FFs, the methodology presented in this paper will be used
instead. Both of them are complementary, and this potentially
allows to quantify the tolerance against SEUs of different
digital circuits, implemented either in an FPGA or as an ASIC.
The presented methodology uses the XilinxTMVirtex-5
XC5VLX110T FPGA as target device. However, it is easily
portable to other XilinxTMVirtex device (such as Virtex-4 or
Virtex-6 [28], [29]) since all of them feature the same kind
of FFs, with identical input/output interfaces. In addition, the
information of the bitstream in different devices is organized
similarly, in a number of frames with different sizes. This
information is easily provided to NESSY by means of a
configuration file.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First of
all, Section II describes the presented fault injection metho-
dology for FFs and the instrumented hardware needed. Next,
Section III explains the modifications introduced in order to
incorporate this methodology in a partial reconfiguration based
fault injection tool, like NESSY. Section IV presents results
and finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. THE FAULT-INJECTION METHODOLOGY IN FPGA
FLIP-FLOPS
For XilinxTMVirtex-5 FPGAs, the information stored in a
FF is not modifiable from the configuration memory of the
device unless a reset of the FPGA’s sequential logic is carried
out [26], [30]. Instead, for each FF, a pair of attributes named
SRHIGH (Set/Reset to HIGH) and SRLOW (Set/Reset
to LOW) in the XilinxTMdocumentation [31], are accessible.
Both attributes are complementary. Thus, they can only take
the following values: SRHIGH = 1, SRLOW = 0 and
SRHIGH = 0, SRLOW = 1. They are in fact accessible
through a single bit in the configuration memory, named
SRHIGH/SRLOW in the following.
The purpose of these attributes is to set the functionality of
the input signals SR (Set/Reset) and REV (REVerse) of the
TABLE I
XILINXTMVIRTEX-5 FF TRUTH TABLE. THE OUTPUT Q SIGNAL IS
UPDATED SYNCHRONOUSLY WITH THE INPUT CLOCK SIGNAL C (NOT
SHOWN IN THE TABLE FOR SIMPLICITY)
SRHIGH=0; SRLOW=1 SRHIGH=1; SRLOW=0
SR REV Q (t+1) SR REV Q (t+1)
0 0 Q (t) a 0 0 Q (t) a
0 1 1 b 0 1 0 b
1 0 0 b 1 0 1 b
1 1 0 b 1 1 0 b
a Updated only if CE = ‘1’
b Updated either if CE = ‘0’ or ‘1’
FPGA FFs, as indicated in Table I. Thus, if SRHIGH = 0
(SRLOW = 1) then SR can be used to initialize the FF to 0
(it acts as a reset signal) and REV , to initialize it to 1 (it acts
as a set signal); whereas if SRHIGH = 1 (SRLOW = 0)
the FF behaves in the opposite way (SR would be a set; and
REV , a reset). Unless stated otherwise, the XilinxTMsynthesis
tools use the Virtex-5 FFs under the operation: SRHIGH =
0, SRLOW = 1.
The XilinxTMsynthesis tools allow to instantiate the FFs
existing in the FPGA by means of primitives in the source
code. A comprehensive list of all the available primitives
available for instantiating Virtex-5 FPGA FFs can be found
in [32]. They basically differ in the number of input entries
that are accessible from the circuit source code (essentially, a
reset and/or set input signals). Among all the available ones,
FDRSE (a D-FF with synchronous reset and set) is the
one that most directly implements a FF in the FPGA. The
reason is that, since SRHIGH = 0 and SRLOW = 1, the
reset input is connected to SR and the set one, to REV .
Other FF primitives are implemented in a similar way, but set
the SR and/or REV signals to ‘0’ in order to comply with
the primitive specifications. In any case, all of them have in
common that they instantiate the same (and unique) kind of
FF available in the FPGA.
The proposed methodology uses the information in Table I
and adds little hardware instrumentation around all the FFs of
the circuit under test in order to emulate SEUs just modifying
the SRHIGH/SRLOW bit. This new hardware (Figure 1)
includes a new input signal inj, inj = 1 indicating that a
SEU must be emulated in any of the FFs of the circuit under
test. This signal is part of the testbench of the circuit. Thus, it
is possible to control the exact clock cycle when the SEU has
to be emulated. Note that Figure 1 shows the particular case
for the FDRSE primitive.
In order to specify in which FF (or FFs) the SEU (or
SEUs) must be emulated, NESSY triggers the attributes
SRHIGH = 1, SRLOW = 0 of the target FF(s) by means
of partial reconfiguration while keeping the remaining ones to
SRHIGH = 0, SRLOW = 1. Of course, in order to do
this, it is not necessary to carry out the Capture&Readback /
Modify of all the FFs on the FPGA. Instead, NESSY identifies
the frame(s) that contain(s) the bit(s) that has/have to be
modified and writes the modified version of that/those frame(s)
onto the configuration memory of the FPGA. A frame is the
4Fig. 1. RTL model of a modified FDRSE FF, for SEU emulations using
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smallest addressable segment of the Virtex-5 configuration me-
mory space, and it contains 1280 configuration bits. Thus, this
approach guarantees that the additional overhead introduced
due to the partial reconfiguration is very low. This point will
be discussed in deeper detail in Section IV.
The exact location of this configuration bit in the circuit
bitstream has been obtained for all the FFs in the FPGA by
reverse engineering on a simple design with one FF: The
SRHIGH and SRLOW attributes were set both to ‘0’/‘1’
and to ‘1’/‘0’ by using the XilinxTMFPGA Editor tool, then
the two resulting bitstreams were compared, and finally it was
discovered that they differed in just one bit. This infomation
allowed obtaining the exact position of this configuration bit,
for any FF located anywhere in the FPGA. This methodology
has been necessary because that information is not available
in the XilinxTMdocumentation [26].
The extra logic added to each FF primitive is implemented
in three Look-Up Tables (LUTs), depicted in Figure 1, and
named FF REV , FF CE and FF SR, respectively. Each
one of them implements the following equations:
FFREV = inj ·Q+ inj · original S (1)
FFCE = inj · original CE (2)
FFSR = inj ·Q+ inj · original R (3)
where original CE, original R and original S are the
signals of the FF originally connected to the Clock Enable
(CE), reset and set inputs, respectively. This is true for the
FDRSE one, where these three inputs are accessible from
the source code. In case a primitive without reset and/or set
was instantiated in the code, it is replaced by the FDRSE,
by setting the missing original reset and/or original set
signals to ‘0’ in order not to alter its original behaviour.
According to (1), (2) and (3), if no SEU is injected
(inj = 0), the FFs work under normal operation (FFCE =
original CE); otherwise, all the FFs of the circuit under
test are updated according to their specific values of the
SRHIGH/ SRLOW configuration bits, and the FFREV and
FFSR inputs following the information in Table 1. Thus, since
the presented methodology makes the target FF work under
the configuration SRHIGH = 1, SRLOW = 0; according
to equations (1) and (2), if inj = 1, then FFSR = Q
and FFREV = Q. Hence if Q = 0, then FFSR = 1 and
FFREV = 0, which triggers Q(t+1) to 1 (bitflip) in the target
FF, and to 0 (no change) in the remaining ones. Following the
same reasoning, if Q = 1, then FFSR = 0 and FFREV = 1,
which triggers Q(t+ 1) to 0 (bitflip) in the target FF, and to
1 (no change) in the remaining ones. Note that, if SEUs are
to be injected in several FFs, then this is done in parallel with
all the involved FFs.
As a consequence of this hardware instrumentation, the
area required to implement a modified design is greater than
its original version. The increase factor with respect to the
original circuit greatly depends on the number of FFs of each
circuit. A discussion about this point is included in Section
IV.
III. FAULT INJECTION FLOW
As hinted above, this methodology has been integrated into
NESSY so two complementary SEU emulation modes are now
possible:
• Exhaustively in the FPGA configuration memory bits that
implement the circuit under test, as described in [27], in
a non-intrusive way. This methodology is suitable to test
the SEU tolerance of FPGA designs.
• Selectively in the FFs of the circuit under test, using
the methodology presented in this paper. Even if it
introduces small modifications in the original circuit, it is
suitable to test the SEU tolerance of digital circuits when
manufactured as ASICs, since these modifications do not
alter the behaviour of the circuit at the register-transfer
level.
The flowchart in Figure 2 depicts how the presented me-
thodology has been integrated in NESSY. Steps 3, 4.1, 4.4
and 4.5 were already implemented in the previous version of
NESSY, whereas Steps 1, 2 and 4.3 are new. These steps
are activated/deactivated, depending on the SEU emulation
mode that is used. Finally, Step 4.2 has been updated from
the previous version in order to support both types of SEU
emulations. This is indicated in the figure through the striped
colouring. A detailed description of this flowchart is provided
below.
First, the XilinxTMISE tool is invoked (Step 1 in Figure 2)
in order to generate a new .vhd file containing a structural
5Fig. 2. The presented fault injection methodology integrated in NESSY
model of the original circuit. This model describes the imple-
mentation of the circuit in terms of XilinxTMprimitives, which
allows interaction with the FPGA FFs at the register level.
Next (Step 2), our approach identifies the FF primitives in
this structural model and for each one of them, it adds the
extra logic described in Figure 1, taking into account that all
of them have a by-default SRHIGH = 0, SRLOW = 1
initialization. This step also updates the physical constraints
file (.ucf) in order to force the physical placement of the FFs.
This is needed because, in XilinxTMFPGAs, the local resets of
the FFs are shared between the four FFs located in the same
FPGA slice. This fact is taken into account in order to place
the FFs in different FPGA slices from each other.
In Step 3, NESSY is invoked to generate two bitstreams:
one with the circuit under test and the other one with the static
part of NESSY. This is explained in greater details in [27].
Finally, Step 4 describes the fault injection methodology
itself. The testbench is firstly executed (Step 4.1) until the
clock cycle where the fault is injected (remember that this is
indicated in the testbench by means of the activation of the
inj input signal to ’1’). Next, the bitflip (Step 4.2) is injected.
In the previous version of NESSY, this was achieved by just
modifying the desired bit in the configuration memory and
by writing the corresponding frame onto the FPGA by using
the ICAP port [27]. In the updated version, it modifies the
SRHIGH/SRLOW bit corresponding to the FF (or FFs)
that is/are to be modified. The positive pulse inj signal is
then generated (Step 4.3) to flip the content of the FF (or
FFs) selected in Step 4.2. Once this has been made, the
remainder of the testbench is executed and, if a fault has been
detected, it is reported (Step 4.4). Finally, the original circuit
TABLE II
FEATURES OF THE BENCHMARKS THAT WERE EVALUATED
Circuit Circuit functionality [#] ofconf. bits
FF
count
b01 FSM that compares serial flows 46,080 5
b02 FSM that recognizes BCD numbers 46,080 4
b03 Resource arbiter 46,080 30
b04 Compute min and max 92,160 66
b05 Elaborate the contents of a memory 138,240 34
b06 Interrupt handler 46,080 9
b07 Count points on a straight line 46,080 49
b08 Find inclusions in number sequences 46,080 21
b09 Serial to serial converter 46,080 28
b10 Voting system 46,080 17
b11 Scramble string with variable cipher 92,160 31
b12 1-player game (guess a sequence) 138,240 121
FFE Finite impulse response filter 1,797,120 622
is restored (Step 4.5). Note that the SRHIGH/SRLOW bit
is not restored until this step. The reason is that it does not
affect the remainder of the testbench execution while the inj
signal is ’0’. In addition, this does not generate unnecessary
delays that an additional frame restoration would involve.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents SEU emulation results on the FFs of
circuits taken from the ITC’99 benchmark set [33] and on a
Feed-Forward Equalization (FFE) filter featuring 16 filtering
steps. For ITC’99 designs, only those from b01 to b12 have
been selected for fault injection. The remaining ones were
not tested as, in its current version, NESSY cannot run fault
injection on microprocessors. On the other hand, the FFE filter
has been selected because it is a realistic application that is
widely used in aerospace contexts and because it is consid-
erably larger than the ITC’99 circuits. Table II summarizes
the main characteristics of the benchmarks, as well as their
number of configuration bits and FF count.
A. Statistical Validation
A statistical methodology was carried out in order to vali-
date the presented methodology. This decision was made since
a validation against a radiation beam was not possible in this
case. The reason is that data issued from radiation ground
tests cannot mimic the fault injection results obtained by the
presented methodology at all, hence they cannot be directly
cross-checked. Indeed, the presented methodology only injects
SEUs in the content of FFs, but experimental data regarding
sensitivity of FPGAs would show the sensitivity of the entire
configuration memory.
In fact, the configuration memory and the programmable
logic of modern FPGAs constitute the same silicon chip.
Hence, they cannot be physically separated in order to only
radiate the programmable logic (which contains the FFs and
the user memory) thereby excluding the configuration memory
from the radiation beam. Hence, in order to make such
experimental validation, it would be necessary either:
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silicon (i.e., an ASIC), whose only elements sensitive to
SEUs are its FFs and memory cells. Such a circuit could
be introduced in a radiation chamber. However, for the
case of the circuits tested in this paper, the only option
would be to make ad-hoc implementations for all of them,
which has an unaffordable financial cost.
• A 100% radhard implementation of an FPGA whose FFs
have not been hardened. However, this is also unfeasible
because commercial radhard FPGAs are hardened at all
levels: programmable logic and routing, user memory
(BlockRAMs and FFs) and embedded logic (multipliers,
processors...).
This motivates that purely fault-injection experiments have
to be carried out in this case. As indicated in [34], the
test space for any fault-injection experiment comprises three
axes: a) the number of fault locations, b) the number of test
vectors and c) the number of program cycles of operation.
However, even for small circuits, exhaustive fault-injection
experiments may involve a combinatorial explosion of test
cases that cannot be managed with an average computer. For
this reason, the methodology presented in this paper does not
carry out exhaustive fault injections either.
If a fault emulation approach is not exhaustive in any of
said axes, the obtained results need to be statistically validated.
Thus, for this experiment: a) A number of SEUs have been
emulated exhaustively in all the FFs of each circuit; b) For
the ITC’99 b01 - b12 circuits, gold vectors provided by the
designers [35] have been used as testbenches. For the FFE, it
was elaborated an ad-hoc testbench that is representative of
all its functionality. And c) NESSY allows emulating SEUs in
any clock cycle of the testbench, as previously described in
Figure 2.
The concepts presented in [36] were used to validate the
presented methodology. The sampling error equation given in
this reference returns the number of SEUs (n) that need to
be injected in a system with N test cases, a given confidence
level and a given margin of error. For these experiments, N =
NUM FFs ∗NUM cycles testbench.
As a first experiment, a confidence level of 90% and a
margin error of 5% have been set. For these parameter values,
the equation in [36] returns 73.21 SEUs per FF for b01 - b12.
Hence, 74 SEUs per FF were injected in these circuits. Note
that we speak in terms of number of SEUs per FF. The total
number of SEUs (n) to be injected in a given circuit is directly
proportional to its number of FFs and the number of testbench
clock cycles. However, since all the testbenches of b01 - b12
have 100 cycles, normalizing n by the number of FFs of each
circuit always returns the same value (73.21). Repeating this
experiment for the FFE, this value was 228 SEUs per FF.
These SEUs were emulated and it was obtained the percent-
age among them that resulted into an error at the output of
the circuit. The first bar in Figure 3 shows these results.
Experiments in bars 2 and 3 in Figure 3 aim at gradually
attain an error margin of 0% (regardless of the confidence
level). For this purpose, 100 SEUs for b01 - b12 and 1000
SEUs for the FFE need to be emulated according to Equations
(1) and (2) in [36]. This means that, from the statistical point
Fig. 3. Failure percentage for the ITC’99 b01-b12 benchmarks and a FFE
filter, for different number of fault injections per FF
of view, these results have the same validity as an exhaustive
fault-injection campaign. Finally, the experiment with 1000
SEUs per FF was also repeated for b01 - b12 (bar 3 in Figure
3).
As the figure shows, for a given circuit, the obtained SEU
sensitivities are very similar. In fact, the gradient of the
regression line that best fits to the three bars is, on average,
0.00027, which is negligible. This demonstrates that the results
issued from bars 1 and 2 were already very accurate. Thus,
the presented methodology can be safely extrapolated to much
larger circuits, where an exhaustive fault-injection experiment
is unfeasible.
Finally, in comparison with [16] one can verify that the
obtained percentage of detected errors for b12 (29.41%) is
very similar to that of [16] (29.8%), even though we both
use completely different testbenches to obtain the results.
This finding further supports the correctness of the presented
approach and the selected experimental setup.
B. Design Overhead
This subsection presents a comparison between the pre-
sented methodology and the ones presented in [16], in terms
of design overhead. The same circuits as in the previous
subsection were used.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the resource consumption of the
modified circuits when using the presented methodology, in
comparison with the so-called Mask-scan, State-scan and
Time-mux ones presented in [16]. The proposed methodology
does not increase nor decrease the [#] FFs with respect to the
original circuits (Figure 4, the +% FFs overhead of all the
circuits is always 0%). However, the Mask-scan and State-scan
approaches double the [#] FFs needed, whereas the Time-mux
one multiplies this number by four. In addition, note that the
proposed approach does not decrease the number of used FFs
for the original circuits either. This proves that the synthesis
tool does not replicate nor remove FFs during the modification
of the circuits.
The design overhead introduced in terms of [#] LUTs (Fi-
gure 5) depends on the methodology used. Thus, Time-mux in-
7Fig. 4. FFs overhead of the modified circuits, when using the presented
method, in comparison with the methodologies in [16]
troduces an average overhead of +275.38% with respect to the
original version of the circuits. This overhead is +176.75% and
+40.51% for State-scan and Mask-scan, respectively, whereas
for the presented approach, it is +143.11%. Thus, the presented
methodology clearly reduces the resource consumption with
respect to Time-mux and State-scan, whereas for Mask-scan,
it reduces the [#] FFs needed by half, while increasing by
49.18% the [#] LUTs needed by this technique. Nevertheless,
it is important to remember that the presented approach has
an additional advantage: it has been integrated in the NESSY
tool [27], which was originally designed to inject faults in the
configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs. Hence, with
this extension, NESSY is now able to quantify the tolerance of
digital circuits against SEUs, both when they are implemented
as an ASIC or configured in an FPGA.
Finally, it is also interesting to observe the existing strong
correlation between the percentages displayed in Figure 5 and
the resource consumption of the original circuits. In general
terms, the larger the original circuit is, the less significant is
the overhead, hence the small FFE bars.
C. Time Overhead
The time overhead introduced by the proposed approach has
also been evaluated.
On the one hand, the execution time of the circuit under
test with NESSY (Step 4 in Figure 2) depends on the size
of the testbench (set to 100 or 1000 input values, depending
on the benchmark), the speed of the platform (constant at 100
MHz) and the time overhead introduced in order to reconfigure
a Virtex-5 frame using the ICAP port (1.6 µs, see [24]).
In our experiments, a circuit running a testbench of 1000
entries takes 10 µs to be completed in NESSY [27]. Thus,
in this case the reconfiguration time penalty is 16% the initial
execution time of the circuit on the platform. This may seem
an important limitation. However, as the size of the testbench
increases, this overhead becomes decreasingly less significant
with respect to the execution time of the circuit under test.
Thus, for instance, let us imagine a fault injection campaign
on a processor that runs at 400 MHz a testbench that takes 1
second to be completed. In that case, the fault injection time of
Fig. 5. LUTs overhead of the modified circuits, when using the presented
method, in comparison with the methodologies in [16]
1.6 µs is negligible with respect to the total tesbench execution
time.
On the other hand, the time needed to carry out Steps 1
and 2 of Figure 2 (which are carried out before the fault
injection campaign) depends on the number of FFs of the
circuit. For the experiments in this section, it was always
less than 1 second. Thus, in comparison with the time needed
by the XilinxTMplacement and routing tools (on the order of
minutes, or even hours), our approach introduces a negligible
time overhead.
Hence, the methodology proposed in this paper is suitable
for fault injection campaigns in large circuits, not only in terms
of execution time, but also because of the little area overhead,
as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has presented a new methodology for SEU
emulation in the embedded FFs of XilinxTMVirtex-5 FPGAs,
although it is valid for any other XilinxTMVirtex device. It
has been integrated into a fault-injection tool named NESSY,
whose previous version [27] could only emulate SEUs into
the FPGA configuration memory. The presented methodology
is a hybrid technique that combines the features of both
instrumentation-based and reconfiguration-based fault injec-
tion approaches. Hence, it achieves a good trade-off between
resource consumption and time overhead with respect to other
approaches existing in the literature. In addition, it extends
the previous functionality of NESSY, and thus it potentially
allows to carry out complementary experiments depending on
the target technology: ASIC or FPGA.
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